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Introduction
Issues on the missing link between 
performance and remuneration have been 
long discussed as they imply rent diversion 
by managers (Hassan, Christopher & Evans, 
2003; Abdullah, 2006; Desai & Dharmapala, 
2006). Managers benefit from remunerations 
by way of increasing personal wealth and 
reputation. In the latter case, in addition to 
being highly associated with outstanding 
achievement, it is also achieved through tax-
planning activities that in turn signify higher 
returns to the shareholders. In Malaysia, 
as there is no limit in claiming directors’ 
remuneration expense, the tendency to 
manipulate the directors’ remuneration as a 
tax-planning technique is higher especially 
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Abstract
Companies involve in tax planning due to its primary benefit of increase after-tax return. 
However, this activity has been an ongoing discussion as it impairs provision of public goods 
which indirectly causes social issues. Companies, in conducting tax planning, make use of 
several techniques to effectively minimise the tax burden, for example, profit sharing, income 
shifting and change of characteristics of income. Directors’ remuneration is also identified 
as a tax-reduction strategy. While increasing the wealth of the directors, higher directors’ 
remuneration expense reduces company taxable income and in turn raises company tax 
savings.  This provides indications about the missing link between directors’ performance and 
pay. In fact, in Malaysia, this issue has been long debated by the public including academics. 
Despite this highlight, little attention has been given to the relationship between tax planning 
and directors’ remuneration. Therefore, this paper reports the results of this study’s focus of 
attention on whether tax planning activity is significantly related to directors’ remuneration 
expenses of non-financial Malaysian public-listed companies. The sample period of the 
study is from 2007 to 2009. The panel dataset is drawn from Datastream and hand-collected 
tax data from company annual reports. The results derived from the multivariate analyses 
highlight the extent of the relationship between tax planning and directors’ remuneration and 
thus enlighten the knowledge on the utilisation of directors’ remuneration as a strategy in tax 
planning. The results also highlight the policy and reporting implications to the authority. 
Keywords: Tax planning, directors’ remuneration, corporate governance, tax rates.
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within companies that have lower ceiling 
limits of remunerations. From a survey on 
directors’ remuneration by loss-suffering 
companies, KPMG finds that a significant 
number of the said type of companies 
continued to reward their directors well in 
2005 (NST, 4 October 2006). This provides 
indication that performance was not a crucial 
element for consideration in deciding the 
directors’ remuneration (Shanmugam, Ming, 
Tan, Mahmud & Hassan, 25 August 2003).
In terms of an association between directors’ 
remuneration and tax planning, however, 
conflating directions may exist in line with 
the argument on complementary relationship 
between managers’ concern on diversion 
and tax sheltering. Evidence from the US 
highlights findings that managers with 
higher incentives possess lower intention 
in corporate tax planning as such incentives 
reduce managers’ rent diversion that in turn 
accompanies lower tax sheltering activities 
and this can further explain variations of 
undersheltering puzzles within companies 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2006).  In the 
Malaysian setting, significance of directors’ 
remuneration as a tax-motivated expense 
allocation is documented by Abdul Wahab 
(2011). The author finds robust results on 
significance of the component of directors’ 
remuneration as an expense in corporate 
effective tax rates (ETR). The results are 
consistent when testing variations across 
industries and years of the panel sample 
period (2007-2009). 
Despite the findings, utilisations of directors’ 
remuneration in tax planning may not hold 
throughout all individual tax bases as the 
individual tax rates in Malaysia exceed 
corporate tax rate when the formers’ taxable 
income reaches RM100,000. Generally, 
companies in Malaysia are liable to pay 
corporate tax at statutory tax rates (STR) 
of 20 per cent on chargeable income up to 
RM500,000 for companies with paid-up 
capital not exceeding RM2.5 million; and 
of 25 per cent for other cases. However, 
variations in ETR are observed due to, among 
else, utilisation of tax provisions, incentives, 
and income shifting (Abdul Wahab, 2011). 
This suggests tax planning existence as 
ETR explains the tax portion of the reported 
income (Rego, 2003) and sequentially ETR 
departures from the STR explain tax saving 
derived therefrom. This further will lead to 
lower tax revenue in the hand of the Malaysian 
tax authority, the Malaysian Inland Revenue 
Board (IRB).
Therefore, the focus of attention of this 
research is twofold. Firstly, to what extent 
is directors’ remuneration related to the tax 
planning activities? Secondly, do reductions 
in individual tax rates contribute to variations 
in corporate tax-planning activities? The 
findings of this research would enlighten the 
knowledge on tax-planning activities among 
the Malaysian public-listed companies. It 
would also contribute to knowledge in the 
sense of providing empirical evidence about 
the influence of directors’ remuneration in 
tax-planning strategy in Malaysia. Further, 
this research will also contribute to the 
taxation literature in explaining the affect 
of individual tax rate reduction on corporate 
tax-planning strategy. This research is useful 
to the authorities to gauge the level of the 
manipulation of directors’ remuneration 
in tax computation and hence, highlights 
policy implication to both companies and 
authorities. 
Directors’ Remuneration in Tax Planning
Directors’ remuneration is the incentive 
or compensation paid to directors for 
performing their duties. This payment, as to 
ht
tp
://
m
m
j.u
um
.e
du
.m
y
ht
tp
://
m
m
j.u
um
.e
du
.m
y
47
Malaysian Management Journal Vol. 15, 31–43 (2011)
reflect the worth of managers’ efforts, needs 
to be aligned with company performance 
as such expense is justified as to increase 
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). But this premise, practically, is 
claimed as not holding true due to the lack 
of congruence between remuneration and 
performance. This is documented by Firth, 
Tam and Tang (1999) in their study on 
the determinants of top management pay. 
The authors find evidence that instead of 
performance, company size is a major top-
management remuneration determinant. 
This performance-pay misalignment issue, 
although mixed arguments have been 
put forward, may relate to tax-planning 
activities. Desai and Dharmapala (2006), in 
a study on tax avoidance and high-powered 
incentive, highlight potential implications of 
remuneration on tax planning. On positive 
intuitive arguments, higher remuneration is 
claimed as being able to can align managers-
shareholders interests and thus increases 
tax- planning activities. On the other hand, 
if the payment is viewed as being able 
to lower the managerial rent diversion, 
higher remuneration is likely to reduce 
tax-planning activities. All these premises 
support arguments on the association of 
remuneration and tax planning. Particularly 
in Malaysia, the opportunity to manipulate 
the expenses is found to be higher due to 
unlimited allowable expense of directors’ 
remuneration in corporate tax computation 
(Income Tax Act 1967 (With Completed 
Rules & Regulations), 2008).  The specified 
provision of the Act, Section 33 of the Income 
Tax Act 1967, stipulates that the allowable 
expenses are only the expenses that are 
wholly and exclusively incurred during a 
basis period, without any reference to the 
limitations of the deductions. Therefore, as 
far as the taxable income determination is 
concerned, tax planning could also be one 
of the determinants to the directors’ pay 
misalignment issue.
In the US, this issue has been in the authority’s 
attention since early 1990s.  The US 
authority, through Revenue Reconciliation 
Act 1993, limits the corporate tax deduction 
for executive compensation to $1 million per 
individual (Balsam & Ryan, 1996). In addition 
to benefiting the shareholders in the sense of 
reducing the gap between performance and 
pay, it also contributes to tax revenue by way 
of reducing remuneration manipulation in tax-
planning activities. Therefore, based on the 
above discussions, directors’ remuneration 
is documented as contributing to the level of 
corporate tax planning activities. Hence, it is 
hypothesised that:
H1:   There is a significant association 
between the level of companies’ tax-
planning activities and directors’ 
remuneration.
Reduction in Individual Tax Rates and 
Directors’ Remuneration
 
Tax planning, if conducted effectively, will 
result in tax saving in the sense of higher 
after-tax return (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992) 
and higher available cash flow (Jones & 
Rhoades-Catanach, 2005). These returns 
can then be channelled to investment either 
in asset or equity terms. Savings can also be 
gained through reduction of tax rates. Through 
US evidence, individual tax rates are found 
to be associated with capital investment due 
to the incremental effect on cash flow (Black, 
Legoria & Sellers, 2000). This finding 
supports the arguments on the relationship 
between reduction in individual tax rates 
and directors’ remuneration in explaining 
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the extent of tax-planning activities in 
which theoretically, with the existence of 
individual tax rates reduction, increments 
of directors’ remuneration decreases the tax 
payments by companies and simultaneously 
increases the managerial personal wealth.
Despite these arguments, reservation should 
be made based on the tax base of an individual 
taxpayer. It is important to note that the 
individual tax rates in Malaysia are lower 
as compared to the corporate tax rate of up 
to RM100,000 of the chargeable income of 
the individual taxpayer. Thus, the direction 
to the extent which the remuneration may 
contribute to tax planning depends on the 
existence of individual tax rate reductions. 
Malaysia experienced several reductions in 
individual tax rates i.e. during 1991, 1993, 
1995, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2009 and 2010. 
Therefore during these years, it was expected 
that the reduction would increase the tax 
saving and thus it would be channelled to 
investment in companies (Abdul Wahab, 
Aripin, Md Idris & Che Ahmad, 2007). 
In line with the presumption, the level of 
corporate tax planning was expected to be 
related to the reduction in the individual tax 
rates. Thus, it is hypothesised that:
H2: The level of corporate tax planning is 
associated with the reduction in individual 
tax rates.
Firm-specific Characteristics
In order to control the firm-specific 
characteristics, this study includes several 
variables that have been found by previous 
researchers to be important in explaining 
cross-sectional differences in tax planning 
(Kern & Morris, 1992; Omer, Molloy & 
Ziebart, 1993; Gupta & Newberry, 1997; 
Holland, 1998; Kim & Limpaphayom, 
1998; Derashid & Zhang, 2003). The 
firm-specific characteristics discussed in 
this study consist of firm size, leverage, 
capital intensity, foreign sales, earnings 
management and industry classifications. 
Zimmerman (1983) says that size of a 
company is positively related to the ETR 
since large firms are exposed to greater 
public scrutiny and thus, the companies 
have to incur the political cost. In contrast, 
Porcano (1986) highlights that there is 
a negative association between size and 
ETR due to greater resources by the larger 
firm to influence the above-mentioned 
political cost. In line with Porcano (1986), 
Derashid and Zhang (2003), in the study 
on a Malaysian sample, find a significant 
negative association between firm size and 
ETR. Gupta and Newberry (1997) also find 
a significant negative relationship between 
size and ETR among 915 U.S. firms during 
four years i.e. 1987–1990. However, during 
1982–1985, with 823 samples of U.S. 
firms , the finding presents that there is a 
significant positive relationship of firm size 
and ETR. 
In line with firm size, Derashid and Zhang 
(2003) also find similar results among 
Malaysian companies about the relationship 
of leverage and ETR. This may be due to 
tax deduction by interest tax shield. 
Another firm-specific characteristic 
controlled in this study is capital intensity. 
Capital intensity, which explains the 
utilisation of property, plant and equipment 
in the business activity, is highly correlated 
to the industrial membership. For example, 
companies in industrial chemicals and 
electrical machinery tend to have high 
capital utilisation (Lim, 1976). Gupta 
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and Newberry (1997) and Derashid and 
Zhang (2003) find a significant negative 
relationship between capital intensity and 
ETR. This shows that companies with a 
greater proportion of fixed asset utilise the 
tax deduction in lowering the ETR (Gupta 
& Newberry, 1997). The deductions include 
capital allowance and incentive provision. 
The next firm characteristic is earnings 
management. It is important to control this 
for the manipulation of financial accounting 
items by managers due to, among other 
things, the intention that is based on 
contractual settings, for instance, in  terms 
of leverage, bonus plan and size (Holland & 
Jackson, 2004). This is in line with Healy and 
Wahlen’s (1999) explanation that earnings 
management “occurs when managers use 
judgement in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance 
of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999: 
368). Consistent with Healy (1985) and 
Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003), earnings 
management in this study is measured based 
on total accrual measures which is derived 
by subtracting nett cash flow from operation 
from profit before tax. This specifically 
controls for variation in the tax planning that 
arises from earnings management (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2009).
Further, the extent of foreign sales is also 
controlled as a proxy for the company’s 
involvement in multinational business. 
The extent of foreign sales is important as 
companies with a high level of multinational 
business activities may have greater 
opportunity to plan their tax. This method of 
tax planning is related to profit or income-
shifting in which, multinational companies 
may plan their tax by transferring their profit 
or taxable income to lower tax jurisdictions. 
The relationship between tax planning and 
the extent of multinational activities has been 
empirically verified by previous researchers 
(for example, Klassen, Lang & Wolfson, 
1993; Mills, Erickson & Maydew, 1998; 
Rego, 2003). Therefore, in order to control 
the effect of the extent of multinational 
operations on cross-sectional difference, 
the extent of foreign sales is included in the 
testing as a control variable. 
In addition to the above firm-specific 
characteristics, industry classification could 
also be associated with ETR. For example, 
manufacturing and hotel industries were found 
to be negatively related to ETR (Derashid 
& Zhang, 2003). This is due to different 
opportunity sets, for example, a different 
investment incentive which is available for 
a different industry classification. In other 
words, it indicates different tax planning 
opportunities across sectors (Mills et al., 
1998). Econometrically, this control variable 
is important to explain the heterogeneity of 
the samples. 
Research Design
The data of this research is collected from 
Thomson Financial Datastream and hand-
collected tax and remuneration data from 
company annual reports. The sample 
consists of non-financial Malaysian public-
listed companies (excluding finance, trust 
and closed-end fund industries as those 
industries are governed by special rules and 
regulations). The sample period is from 2007 
to 2009 to incorporate the latest available 
data for panel data analysis. To reflect 
persistent ability in conducting tax planning 
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activities, following Mills et al. (1998), loss-
suffering companies are excluded. Similarly, 
companies with negative tax charge are also 
excluded to control influence on tax planning 
measures by other than the current-year-
taxable-income factor. A further restriction 
imposed on the sample is the companies 
have extreme ETR value (ETR>1) due to 
non-recurring statutory reconciling items 
(Phillips, 2003).  Table 1 presents the sample 
selection process that leads to the initial 
sample of 321 companies, i.e. a strongly 
balanced panel data of 963 firm-years.
50
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s fferi  c a ies are e cl e . i ilarl , 
c a ies it  e ati e ta  c ar e are als  
e cl e  t  c tr l i fl e ce  ta  la i  
eas res  t er t a  t e c rre t- ear-
ta a le-i c e fact r.  f rt er restricti  
i se   t e sa le is t e c a ies 
 
a e e tre e  al e ( ) e t  
-rec rri  stat t r  rec cili  ite s 
( illi s, ).  a le  rese ts t e sa le 
selecti  r cess t at lea s t  t e i itial 
sa le f  c a ies, i.e. a str l  
ala ce  a el ata f  fir - ears.
Table 1
Sample Selection
Details Number of 
observations
Number of 
companies
Non-financial public-listed companies 801
At least one year of annual report is not available (89)
Accounting period of more than 12 months (14)
Not available in  Datastream (9)
Negative profit before tax (306)
Negative tax charge (46)
1011 337
Extreme value of ETR (17)
Unbalanced data (31)
Initial sample 963 321
Model Specification
The empirical analysis of this study is based 
on the following model that is employed 
to investigate the association between tax 
planning and directors’ remuneration.
TP it=ß 0+ß 1DR it+ß 2DITRR it+ß 3SIZE it+ 
Where:
TP = Tax planning, measured  
 as STR – ETR (ETR is 
 measured as a ratio of  
 current income tax   
           payable to pre-tax
  income.
DR = Directors’remuneration, 
 measured as aratio of  
 total directors’ 
 remuneration to   
 beginning book value of  
 equity.
DITRR = Dummy measure of   
  individual tax rates  
 reduction; 1 for  
 reduction, 0 otherwise. 
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Further explanations on tax planning (TP), 
directors remuneration (DR) and reduction in 
individual tax rates (DITRR) are discussed in 
the next three sub-sections. Other variables, 
SIZE, LEV, EM, CAPINT, FS and INDDUM 
are control variables as they reflect firm 
specific characteristics (discussed in section 
2.3 above) which, either directly or indirectly, 
contribute to opportunities of tax planning.
Tax Planning Measure
Company tax burden information is 
not publicly available which thus leads 
researchers to proxy the measure using 
several variables such as ETR (for example 
Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986; Holland, 
1998; Mills et al., 1998; Rego, 2003; Dyreng, 
Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008) and book-tax 
gap (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009).1 This 
study measures tax planning as the saving 
derived therefrom which can be calculated as 
deviations of current tax expenses from the 
STR. This measure is in line with Salamon 
and Siegfried (1977) and is often used by 
previous tax-burden literature as it represents 
the ability of companies to exploit and 
manipulate provisions in the tax systems and 
codes. This in turn, reflects firm behaviour 
in tax planning by way of political scrutiny 
(Zimmerman, 1983), accruals (Holland, 
1998) and manipulation of book-income 
(Northcut & Vines, 1998).
As current tax expense explains tax payable 
by companies in a year of assessment, ETR is 
measured to reflect the ratio of tax expense to 
the profit of the year. Despite this definition, 
several ways have been used to measure ETR 
to suit the studies’ objectives and needs, for 
example, tax payable over pre-tax accounting 
income (Porcano, 1986; Rego, 2003) and tax 
payable over cash flow (Singh, Wilder & 
Chan, 1987; Gupta & Newberry, 1997). To 
avoid potential issues related to cash flow, 
for example timing incongruence between 
cash flow and accruals, and dissimilarities 
between bases to determine tax paid and 
tax liability, this study measures ETR by 
deflating current tax expense with profit 
before tax (PBT).2
51
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deflating current tax expense ith profit 
before tax (PBT).2
   
SIZE = Size of company,   
 measured as a ratio of  
 total asset to beginning  
 book value of equity.
LEV = Leverage of company,  
 measured as a ratio of  
 long-term debt to total  
 asset.
EM = Earnings management,  
 measured as a ratio of  
 the difference between  
 profit before tax and   
 cash from operation, to  
 beginning book value of  
 equity.
CAPINT = Capital intensity of  
 company, measured as  
 a ratio of gross machine  
 and equipment to total  
 asset.
FS = Foreign sales, measured  
 as a percentage of   
 foreign sales to net sales.
INDDUM = Dummy measure of  
 industrial product  
 industry.
  
� = Error term
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Thus, as ETR explains the ratio of tax paid by 
companies to the profit generated in the year, 
departure of ETR from STR signifies tax 
saving derived from tax-planning activities. 
Therefore, in light of this, tax planning in this 
study is measured as the difference between 
STR and the firm ETR.3   
Directors Remuneration Measure
The directors remuneration variable in this 
study is defined as remuneration expense to 
directors (accrual basis). The data is hand-
collected data from notes to the accounts 
from company annual reports. To control bias 
of inconsistency in reporting remuneration 
in the forms of benefit-in-kind, the items 
are filtered out from the measurement. This 
data is further scaled with beginning book 
value of equity to control for scale-effect 
heteroscedasticity (Stark & Thomas, 1998; 
Akbar & Stark, 2003; Horton, 2008). 
   
Dummy Measure of Reduction in 
Individual Tax Rates
In assessing whether reductions in individual 
tax rates contribute to the extent of corporate 
tax planning activities, a dummy variable of 
individual tax rates reduction is included in 
the regression model. The reduction which 
affects the activity in the sense of increased 
cash flow, as discussed above, can then be 
channelled to investment in increasing the 
personal wealth. In addition, the reduction 
attracts the managers’ attention to focus more 
on personal tax planning instead of company 
tax-planning activities.  Throughout the 
sample period, the tax rates had declined 
once in 2009 and hence the data is coded as 
“1” for 2009 and “0” for other cases.
Results
This section discusses the results derived 
from the analyses. Prior to the analyses, 
several diagnostic tests had been conducted 
to analyse the underlying assumption of 
the tests. Outliers of 40 observations, i.e. 
observations with studentized residual value 
of >|2| (Chen, Ender, Mitchell & Wells, 
2005), were excluded. As a consequence, 
a further 62 observations were excluded to 
ensure a balanced panel dataset. In assessing 
influential observation, exclusion of 56 
observations had been done based on critical 
value of DEFIT measure, i.e. abs DFIT>2*(P/
N)1/2 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).4 This 
is further followed by the exclusion of 49 
observations to balance the data. These 
exclusions result in a final sample of 756 
observations, i.e. 252 companies. The model 
was also analysed for multicollinearity using 
correlation matrices and variance inflation 
factor (VIF) measure (Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2006), and condition 
indices (Belsley et al., 1980). The tests 
indicate insignificant multicollinearity.5
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of 
the final sample utilised in estimating the 
regression model. Averagely the tax saving 
derived from the tax-planning activities 
during the three-year sample period is 5.23 
per cent given the STR of 27, 26 and 25 per 
cents respectively for years 2007 until 2009. 
This implies the existence of tax-planning 
activities of large Malaysian public-listed 
companies. The scaled directors remuneration 
variable (DR) which indicates an average 
of 0.01421 represents a higher portion of 
remuneration than the firm beginning book 
value of equity.  
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
n=756 Mean Min Max Standard deviation
TP 0.05232 -0.24080 0.27000 0.09342
DR 0.01421 0.00004 0.09356 0.01323
SIZE 1.99590 0.87558 10.82186 0.89761
LEV 0.06911 0.00000 0.36907 0.08320
EM 0.01763 -1.30682 1.61361 0.18732
CAPINT 0.18630 0.00000 1.06506 0.20983
FS (%) 9.81670 0.00000 100.00000 19.14045
Regression Results
The results from the estimation model are 
presented in Table 3. As the Breusch-Pagan/ 
Table 3
Regression Results
Dependent variable: TP ßn
DR
-0.08286
(-0.32)
DITRR -0.02350
(-4.83)***
SIZE 0.00604
(1.36)
LEV 0.05577
(1.18)
EM 0.03819
(2.41)**
CAPINT 0.08868
(4.03)***
FS 0.00015
(0.81)
Cook-Weisberg tests for heteroscedasticity 
indicate significant inconstant variance of 
residuals, the reported results are based 
on clustered Eicker-Huber-White adjusted 
standard errors (Petersen, 2009). 
(continued)
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The reported coefficients show a negative 
relationship between directors’ remuneration 
(DR) and the extent of tax-planning 
activities (TP). This result, however, is not 
significant (p=0.748) indicating that directors 
remuneration is not a significant driver in 
tax-planning activities of Malaysian public-
listed companies. Therefore, the result 
fails to support hypothesis H1 in testing the relationship between directors remuneration 
and the extent of company tax-planning 
activities. 
In investigating the relationship between 
reduction of individual tax rate (DITRR) and 
the level of corporate tax-planning activities, 
the results in Table 3 report a significant 
(p=0.000) negative coefficient which 
suggests that managers put in less effort on 
corporate tax planning when the reduction 
in individual tax rate is available. This result 
supports the moral hazard theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) in explaining managers’ 
conflict of interest in pursuing their personal 
wealth while managing the companies on 
behalf of the shareholders. Thus, the result 
supports hypothesis H2 in examining the relationship between reduction of individual 
tax rates and the extent of corporate tax-
planning activities.
 
In addition to the above, Table 3 reports 
a positive and significant (p=0.016) 
relationship between earnings management 
(EM) and corporate tax planning (TP). This 
expected result, suggesting higher earnings 
management, explains a higher level of tax-
planning activities. Similarly, the expected 
positive sign of a relationship between 
capital intensity (CAPINT) and tax planning 
(TP) is documented suggesting utilisation of 
capital allowance provision in corporate tax 
planning.
Further Analysis
To assess the robustness of the above results, 
several further analyses were conducted. 
The analyses comprise re-estimation using a 
fixed-effect estimation model, non-linearity 
of directors’ remuneration variable (DR), 
analyses based on median of directors’ 
remuneration (DR) and endogeneity test 
using a lag variable.
The results derived based on firm fixed-
effect estimation model are qualitatively 
similar to the initial results based on the 
random-effect estimation model. Hence, the 
initial results are robust upon controlling 
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The reported coefficients show a negative 
relationship between directors’ remuneration 
(DR) and the extent of tax-planning 
activities (TP). This result, however, is not 
significant (p=0.748) indicating that directors 
remuneration is not a significant driver in 
tax-planning activities of Malaysian public-
listed companies. Therefore, the result 
fails to support hypothesis H1 in testing the 
relationship between directors remuneration 
and the extent of company tax-planning 
activities. 
In investigating the relationship between 
reduction of individual tax rate (DITRR) and 
the level of corporate tax-planning activities, 
the results in Table 3 report a significant 
(p=0.000) negative coefficient which 
suggests that managers put in less effort on 
corporate tax planning when the reduction 
in individual tax rate is available. This result 
supports the moral hazard theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) in explaining managers’ 
conflict of interest in pursuing their personal 
wealth while managing the companies on 
behalf of the shareholders. Thus, the result 
supports hypothesis H2 in exa ining the 
relationship bet een reduction of individual 
tax rates and the extent of corporate tax-
planning activities.
In addition to the above, Table 3 reports 
a positive and significant (p=0.016) 
relationship between earnings management 
(EM) and corporate tax planning (TP). This 
expected result, suggesting higher earnings 
management, explains a higher level of tax-
planning activities. Similarly, the expected 
positive sign of a relationship between 
capital intensity (CAPINT) and tax planning 
(TP) is documented suggesting utilisation of 
capital allowance provision in corporate tax 
planning.
Further Analysis
To assess the robustness of the above results, 
several further analyses were conducted. 
The analyses comprise re-estimation using a 
fixed-effect estimation model, non-linearity 
of directors’ remuneration variable (DR), 
analyses based on median of directors’ 
remuneration (DR) and endogeneity test 
using a lag variable.
The results derived based on fir  fixed-
effect esti ation odel are qualitatively 
si ilar to the initial results based on the 
rando -effect esti ation odel. ence, the 
initial results are robust upon controlling 
Dependent variable: TP ßn
Constant
0.06129
(3.91)***
Industry dummy Yes
n 756
R-squared 29.22%
Wald 187.99(12)***
Breusch-Pagan 31.79(12)***
Note
Figures in parentheses represent cross-section clustered Eicker-Huber-White adjusted t-statistics.
***, ** and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tailed) respectively.
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for heterogeneity of firm characteristics. In 
examining the possibility of non-linearity 
relationship between tax planning and 
directors remuneration, the results reported 
in Table 3 were re-estimated by incorporating 
quadratic variable of directors remuneration 
(DR2). The results indicate insignificant 
change in R-squared (∆F=0.70, p=0.4015) 
suggesting qualitatively no different than the 
initial estimation model. 
In testing whether a higher level of incentive 
may influence the extent of tax-planning 
activity differently than the other counterpart 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2006), the data 
was regressed based on the median of DR. 
Both estimations (higher and lower than 
the median of DR) indicate insignificant 
difference than the combined estimation as 
reported in Table 3. Further, to investigate 
the endogeneity issue in the data, the model 
was re-estimated by the inclusion of lagged 
variable of DR (Larcker & Rusticus, 2007). 
This is important in controlling violation of 
zero-conditional-mean assumption of the 
regression model (Baum, 2006). The initial 
results are robust of which the added variable 
is reported as insignificant (p=0.390) in 
explaining its relationship with TP.
To assess variations in annual results, the 
data was annually regressed. The initial 
results of the panel data are similar to the 
annual reported regression results. Therefore, 
the results can be concluded as consistent 
throughout the sample period.
Conclusions
This study reports an existence of tax-
planning activities of the Malaysian public-
listed companies. The results of the study 
find a insignificant relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and the extent of 
corporate tax-planning activities suggesting, 
unlike the US study (Desai & Dharmapala, 
2006), directors’ remuneration is not a 
significant component in tax-planning 
decisions. This result is consistent upon 
controlling several factors; firm fixed-effect, 
non-linearity of directors’ remuneration 
variable (DR), analyses based on median 
of directors’ remuneration (DR) and 
endogeneity. The result is also qualitatively 
persistent throughout the years. Further, this 
study documents an adverse relationship 
between the availability of individual tax 
rates reduction and the level of corporate 
tax-planning activities. This, from agency 
theory’s point of view (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), indicates managerial intention to 
pursue personal wealth objective instead of 
maximising firm value for shareholders. 
This study contributes to knowledge by 
highlighting the corporate tax-planning 
level in Malaysia. It also contributes to the 
taxation and corporate governance literature 
by suggesting further evidence in supporting 
managerial conflict of interest through tax-
planning. The authorities have also been 
highlighted with the evidence of little 
consideration of directors’ remuneration in 
corporate tax-planning activities.
Applying the results to the population, 
however, is limited due to restrictions applied 
to the selected sample. Therefore, it may be 
worth while in future studies to extend this 
study by employing a larger sample size 
comprising various categories and sizes of 
companies. 
During the study period (2007–2009), not 
only the individual tax rate was reduced 
but the corporate tax rate was also reduced. 
However, those changes were not taken into 
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account during this time of analysis.  Thus, 
future study may include this reduction in 
corporate tax rate in the analysis to see the 
influence on the results.  
It is also important to highlight the limitation 
of the tax-planning measure as it implies 
the tax expense disclosed in the financial 
statement. However, as mentioned above, 
as the tax burden data is kept confidential, 
previous literature continues proxying tax 
planning with ETR measure. Therefore, the 
result of this study should be interpreted with 
an acknowledgement of the limitations of the 
actual tax burden measurement and thus it is 
essential for authorities to consider limitation 
in tax disclosure in financial reporting. 
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End Notes
1Algebraically, the measure of ETR is 
equivalent to book-tax gap measure where 
PBT(ETR-STR)=(taxable income – PBT)
STR.
2A study by Derashid and Zhang (2003) finds 
no significant correlation between ETR and 
cash flow differences between these two 
measures in reflecting firm tax burden.
3 STR of large companies in Malaysia for 
years of assessments 2007, 2008 and 2009 
were 27, 26 and 25 per cents respectively.
4 P is defined as the number of independent 
variables and N is the number of 
observations.
5 All bivariate correlation coefficients of the 
variables are below 0.9 and the VIF value is 
less than 10 (Hair et al., 2006). The maximum 
condition index is 9.61 that is below that the 
threshold level of 30 (Belsley et al., 1980).
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